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OLIVERI v. DELTA STEAMSHIP LINES, INC.
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1 June 1988
849F.2d 742
The same preset value discount rate used in diminishing awards for future pecuniary losses should be used in diminishing
awards for future pain and suffering.
FACTS: A licensed third assistant engineer brought an action
against the shipowner, Midland Ross Corporation <Midland),
under the Jones Act to recover damages for injuries to his foot
suffered while working on a vessel. The district court admitted
testimony by a union representative as to the probable loss of
future wages and promotional benefits of an average new
member. The judge instructed the jury that it did not have to
accept the testimony and also that it was to render an unadjusted
award for both future pecuniary and non-pecuinary loss. The
jury awarded $240,000 for lost future earnings and $50,000 for
future pain and suffering. The judge subsequently deducted 2'k
from the award for present value discount purposes. Delta ap
pealed on the grounds that evidence regarding Oliveri's future
earning capacity was improperly admitted and that the present
value discount calculation was incorrectly performed.
ISSUES: 1. Is testimony from an official of the union, which
the injured plaintiff was barred from joining, admissible as
evidence to ascertain the lost expected earnings?
2. Whether the same present value discount value
rate employed in diminishing awards for future pecuniary los
ses should also be used in diminishing awards for future pain
and suffering?
ANALYSIS: 1. The Court of Appeals admitted the testimony
as evidence stating that the court has wide discretion in deciding
to admit testimony of any witness. Admissions of such testimony
will more likely be upheld when the evidence used to establish
lost future pecuniary gains is backed by empirical evidence such
as wage scales and contracts of employment. The data presented
to the jury must be sufficiently clear so that the jury could
reasonably assess the plaintiffs chances of promotion and sal
ary incrementation over the years. Furthermore, the court must
clearly instruct the jury that they may disregard any parts of or
the entire testimony of a witness.
2. The Court of Appeals remanded to the lower
court only the issue of the proper calculation of the discount rate
for future pecuniary loss, holding the lower court erred when it
reduced the jury award by a one time flat 29l- deduction from the
total amount. The court cannot take away this prerogative from
the jury without stipulation from both parties. The Court of
Appeals did not find such stipulation, and therefore the issue of
the present value discount to be deducted was to be retned
before a new jury. This amount would be deducted from the
lump sum award of the previous jury.
The two components to this deduction are the projected infla
tion rate, and the projected rate of return on a risk free invest-

ment over the period the plaintiff would lose his expected wages.
Given this, the amount that the jury awards is deemed as taking
the discount rate into consideration. However, if by party stipu
lation the discounting is left to the judge then the court must
instruct the jury not to incorporate discounting in their calcula
tion. The judge will calculate it using the 2% per year standard.
Furthermore, if the plaintiff shows that the jury, despite the
instructions of the court, incorporated the discount rate in their
final award the judge had to accept this and not further di
minish award.
The Court of Appeals upheld the lower court's determination
of a one time, 2% reduction of the jury award for non-pecuniary
future loss. The court acknowledged that several older decisions
from this circuit held contrary to imposing any kind of reduction
of lost future non-pecuniary gain. See Alexander Nash-Kelvinator
Corp., 271 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1959); Yodice v. Koninklijke
Nederlandsche Stoombot Maatschappij, 443 F.2d 756 (2d Cir.
1971); and Rapisardi v. United Fruit Co., 441 F.2d 1308 <2d Cir.
1971). However, starting with Chiarello v. Domenico Bus Service
Inc., 542 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1976), the court stated that "diseount
ing was not only appropriate but preferable." Id. at 886. InMetz v.
United Technologies Corp., 754 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1985), the court
set the rule that the discount rate used would be below the rate
used when calculating lost pecuniary expectancy. "All that is
essential is to reach a result that properly takes into account the
time value of money." 764 F.2d at 68 n.3. The court, allowed the
29l- reduction in the award to stand. Recognizing the discrepancy
with the majority of other circuit and state courts, it went on to
say that "[i]f we were writing on a clear slate, we might be
inclined to accept the view of the other circuits and reject any
discounting of future non-pecuniary losses. However, we are ob
liged to reckon with the clear preference for discounting expres
sed by this circuit ..." 849 F.2d at 751.
The court allowed the award to be diminished in an express
attempt not to prejudice the plaintiff here by ordering a new trial
on this issue as well. The defendants, in trying to get as large a
present value discounting as possible will seek to keep the calcu
lation away from the court, and to present the jury with as high
discount rate figures as possible in order to minimize the final
award. Injured plaintiffs in seeking higher awards will try to
have the court decide the issue. It seems that given the court's
rationale, the acknowledgment of its minority view, and its in
terest in keeping uniformity throughout the circuits, the court
may be persuaded to follow the majority view in the future and
not allow present value deduction on future pain and suffering
losses.
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